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The external debt 
of the Latin American countries 
Raúl Prebisch* 
Until a short time ago, the view was frequently held that the worst was over in relation to the external 
debt of the developing countries: interest rates would fall and a revival of trade was just around the 
corner. 
I do not know what is going to happen in the future. But who can believe in the probability of much 
lower rates given the current United States budget deficit? Who can expect an intense revival óf the 
developing countries' trade, present conditions in the major industrial centres being what they are? 
Meanwhile, the debtor countries have had to resort to emergency solutions. Their heavy interest 
burden has been paid partly by increasing the debt and partly by obtaining an external surplus through 
a drastic cut in imports. 
According to some projections, the developing countries should cut back on their imports in order 
to obtain an external surplus, but generally the very serious internal consequences of such a step are 
ignored. The fact is that the developing countries have to follow a policy of growth to counteract the 
effects of years of low rates of development or stagnation. So, even if external conditions were to 
improve, the first priority should be a higher rate of growth. 
We should not forget that import restrictions have added to the adverse effects of the fall of exports 
and the deterioration of the terms of trade. This combination of factors was responsible for the intense 
contraction of economic activities which resulted in higher levels of unemployment and disguised 
unemployment. In consequence, chronic inflation has grown considerably worse. 
Take the case of Argentina. Very drastic measures have been taken recently in order to ward off 
the imminent risk of hyperinflation. The task in itself is very difficult, but the lack of a proper solution 
to the debt problem is seriously jeopardizing the success of the entire plan. Social and political stability 
are at stake. 
However, up to now I cannot see any signs of a fundamental change of attitude on the part of the 
creditor countries. Moreover, I am extremely concerned by the internal effects as well as the adverse 
impact on our relations with developed countries, especially the United States. 
This is basically a political problem in both its origin and development. Short-term lending 
operations by important banks using the resources of the Eurodollar market have not been subject to 
any regulation whatsoever, notwithstanding the recognition that such regulation is indispensable in 
internal banking activities. On the other hand, developing countries fell all too easily into the 
temptation to borrow lavishly without a clear sense of responsibility. 
I do not in any way mean that governments should take charge of the negotiations. Nonetheless, I 
do feel that governments should establish a framework within which these negotiations are to be held. 
Several suggestions have been offered. There are no magic solutions, however, and both debtors 
and creditors should share the burden. The share of the former has already been very great owing to 
the contraction of their economies, but the latter have not suffered except in a few cases. Any 
deliberate reduction in interest rates would inevitably be detrimental to banks, and the extension of 
maturities would deprive them of quite large commissions and charges. 
But I do not see how this can be avoided. I always bear in mind the wise way in which New York city 
solved its debt problem a few years ago: a far-sighted solution for all the parties concerned. 
•Testimony given by the author in the United States House of Representatives, July 1985. 
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The moment has arrived to enter decisively into a new stage. Our countries have been reluctant to 
form a debtors' club, and rightly so. But the situation seems to me untenable. I am afraid that sooner or 
later unilateral measures may be taken if nothing is done; some countries have already had to take such 
measures on a temporary basis. 
Such an outcome would be highly regrettable from every point of view, except perhaps from the 
standpoint of some short-term political interest. In parentheses, I would like to recall that at the 
beginning of the 1930s, as a young Under-Secretary of Finance, I strongly advocated the full payment 
of the debt. Argentina was one of the few debtor countries that continued to do so, at a great sacrifice. I 
do not think that this could be repeated under the present difficult circumstances, if a proper solution 
is not found. 
Several ideas are in the air. I myself feel rather inclined towards the idea that debtor countries 
should pay the full amount of interest charges but should transfer only a part of it and deposit the rest 
in a fund to be used for investment purposes, under conditions agreed upon by both parties, taking 
into consideration the foreign constraints on development. I consider this a very constructive way out 
of the present serious situation. 
This is not the only matter of concern to me. Your country, as well as mine, is wasting a great 
opportunity to build new relationships with a long-term perspective. We should not repeat the errors of 
the past. Many mistakes have been made on both sides. An objective appraisal has to be made, but time 
is getting short. Let us begin a frank discussion right now. 
